

rying on. The State Department in recommending the admission of these delegates is hampering and sabotaging the work that so many of us are trying to do in exposing the real truth about international communism, the real truth about conditions behind the Iron Curtain, the real truth about the world menace we face today at home and abroad.

I am not crying "treason, treason" when I speak so. I am not accusing either the National Council of Churches of Christ, of which my own church is a member, or the State Department of being infiltrated with Communists who have engineered this accomplishment. But I do say that there are those in authority in both places who are blinded by their naivete, who stubbornly refuse to face the facts, who persist in an incomprehensible course of nonrealism. Those of whom I speak are persons, especially in the State Department, who should know better than to persist in this foolish attempt at peaceful coexistence and cooperation with international communism and its disciples. As our speaker said on July 9: "What possible chance is there for coexistence of this outlaw conspiracy alongside a civilization based on truth, trust, and faith, on freedom and the individual dignity of man?"

Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, certain of my colleagues and I recently spoke in our minority report on the mutual security program of the need for this country to exercise a spiritual and a moral leadership worthy of a great heritage and a great people. I stand here before you and say that a compromise with evil which admits these Communist delegates to our shores in the name of organized religion, that such a compromise is an abnegation of that moral leadership which the entire anti-Communist world is looking to us to provide. And I say shame on any who have lent themselves to the practice of this betrayal.

REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, when a Russian diplomat or a Red spy is chosen to operate inside the free world, his loyalty to communism has met all the incredibly thorough checking of the Reds.

After 12 successful missions behind the Iron Curtain, author-lecturer John Morley said:

No one is approved for clearance outside Russia unless his record and credentials are checked and rechecked by one of the most secret departments of the Soviet Union.

And he concluded:

So when one of these "approved" Reds voluntarily escapes to the West, it's a sure sign that something critical is brewing behind the Iron Curtain.

Does this mean there are some weaknesses in the Soviet empire that may be exploited by the Free World for ultimate victory in the struggle against Communist aggression?

Very definitely—if there is substance to data filtering out by devious channels from behind the Iron Curtain which I

am summarizing today. Naturally, it is impossible to recheck the sources of this information, and I do not certify its accuracy. My purpose is to lay it before you for your own evaluation.

However, important confirmation of much previously unsubstantiated intelligence was made in a dramatic fashion recently by one of these "approved" Red escapees. He is Nikolai Khokhlov, a former Soviet secret police agent.

Sent to West Berlin to murder an important foe of the Soviet regime, Khokhlov instead surrendered to his intended victim. On May 21 of this year Senator WILLIAM E. JENNER's International Security Subcommittee Investigating Soviet Assassination and Terrorism interviewed him.

Here in part, are his responses to questions by Senator JENNER and the subcommittee's chief counsel, Charles P. Grimes:

Mr. GRIMES. Now, it is true, is it not, that you have been an officer of the MGB for some 13 years?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I was a collaborator, that is, a worker with the MGB, and the officer's rank I have had since 1950, since September 1950.

Mr. GRIMES. Now, what is the MGB and its predecessor, the NKVD, will you please explain?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The MGB is a service which is engaged in the affairs of intelligence and counterintelligence. This service is engaged in sending agents abroad and in countering the activities of enemy agents.

When this organization exists alone, its name is MGB. When this organization is merged into a ministry of internal affairs, then its identity, or the name is lost, and it becomes a part of either MVD, or as it was NKVD.

Mr. GRIMES. NKVD was the original name?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Before that, there was also another name, NKGB, which actually was the same.

Mr. GRIMES. Did you belong to any particular branch of the MGB?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. GRIMES. What branch was that?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. During the war, the name of this service was the Fourth Administration. Then its official function was the partisan, that is the guerrilla warfare, with the Germans.

After the war, the name of this service was changed to the Bureau No. 1. It was stated officially that the purpose of this bureau was preparation for training for the future partisan warfare.

In 1953, this service once again was renamed, and this time it was known as the Ninth Section.

However, it is known to me for certain that the real purpose of this organization for all this period was diversionary activities and terroristic work for the Soviet benefit abroad.

Mr. GRIMES. Will you please describe what the terroristic activities abroad consisted of?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. In the official language of the MGB, official terminology of the MGB, the term "terroristic activities" means the implementation of directions dealing with the assassinations or murder of individual persons.

Mr. GRIMES. And what does the phrase "diversionary activities" mean as used by the Soviet Government and your agency and department?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Diversionary activities include sabotage, organization of explosions, fires, in harbors and other installations, and the sabotage in plants, destruction of different types of war production, throwing bombs in various cities in order to create panic, this is basically all.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want to ask how extensive is this organization of MGB? In how many countries is it operated to your knowledge?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This is a very extensive organization, and one could say it covers all countries.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask if they have an American desk, this terrorist organization?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, within this organization, there is a certain section which is engaged in work on America.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a member of the MGB?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I am an officer of MGB.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you now?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No; not since the moment of defection, I am not or have not been an officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you refuse to carry out an assignment to commit murder?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; I refused, I never performed the assignments to murder.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Because I consider that the murder or assassination is a crime against religion and conscience.

Mr. GRIMES. Would you please state the events from the time that you received this assignment, where you received it, when you received it, and who gave you this assignment?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. I received an assignment on the organization for the assassination of Okolovich in the beginning of October 1953.

Mr. GRIMES. Who was Okolovich?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. One of the leaders of the emigre movement known as NTS.

The CHAIRMAN. What does NTS stand for?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. National Labor Work Alliance.

Mr. GRIMES. Is it really an alliance of workers, or is it something else?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No; this alliance unites the most diversified strata of people.

Mr. GRIMES. Are they all emigres from Russia?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. GRIMES. What is their purpose?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. To carry out a revolution in Russia and to replace the present regime with the one that would be more free.

Mr. GRIMES. Has this organization been in existence, to your knowledge, since the 1930's?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; approximately since that period.

Mr. GRIMES. Is it a large organization insofar as you know?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; it is a large organization.

Mr. GRIMES. What is the basis of your knowledge of this organization?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. The data that are in the possession of the MGB and the data that was given to me for my knowledge by my superiors.

Mr. GRIMES. And you had to study it intensively; did you not?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes.

Mr. GRIMES. Mr. Khokhlov, you have testified about your assignment to head the assassination group of Mr. Okolovich and your study of the dossier of the NTS.

Did not the dossier presented to you as a preliminary step also contain a file on Okolovich himself?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, there was a special dossier on Okolovich in this file which gave detailed information covering all aspects of Okolovich's personal life to the extent which was known to Soviet Intelligence Service.

Mr. GRIMES. Did you learn from that file, or otherwise, of previous attempts made against Mr. Okolovich and Mrs. Okolovich?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, I knew the whole story, the complete story of attempts to assassinate Okolovich and also attempts to kidnap him.

Mr. GRIMES. Had there been an attempt to kidnap his wife also, do you know?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. No; they did not make any attempts to kidnap his wife. It was merely planned to kill her in case she interfered.

Mr. GRIMES. Not to kidnap; just to kill her if necessary; is that it?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, precisely.

Mr. GRIMES. Now, will you tell us, please, about this assignment, starting with when you first received word that this was to be your assignment?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This assignment as given to me at first by my direct superior, Colonel Studnikov.

Mr. GRIMES. And who in turn was his superior?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Panyushkin.

Mr. GRIMES. Panyushkin was the former Ambassador to the United States of America from Soviet Russia; is that correct?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; this is precisely so.

Mr. GRIMES. And you know that to be the same man who was our Ambassador here for some 5 years?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; this was the story mentioned within the ministry.

Mr. GRIMES. Now, what precisely was your assignment as given you by Studnikov?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Studnikov told me that I am given an assignment to organize a liquidation of one of the most distinguished Russian emigres, who was the most dangerous enemy of the Soviet power.

I myself was categorically forbidden to assassinate him personally, inasmuch as I was the leader of this operation, the organization of the assassination. I was supposed to recruit two German agents to carry out the assassination. These men were to be selected from the personnel of the agents whom we had available in Eastern Germany.

Furthermore, I had to prepare the documents for them, to prepare the story for them, and order the weapons for them, and take steps to organize their trip to Frankfurt.

Furthermore, I was supposed to give them instructions as to how the plan should be implemented. I was supposed to give them instruction as to how approximately the deed had to be carried out.

For this purpose, several agents of Eastern Germany, and those who were in Western Germany, were given to me for my disposal. I had to send them to collect information and data on Okolovich and for taking pictures of the place of Okolovich's residence.

Such was the basic assignment in its main parts. As to the details, I had to work them out myself.

Mr. GRIMES. Now, in connection with that, were you given a file on the NTS to study?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; so that I would have the precise idea as to what this organization is.

Mr. GRIMES. Now based upon the file which you were given to study, in connection with this assassination assignment, what did you discover as to the purposes and effectiveness of the NTS, the National Labor Alliance?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. On the basis of my study of the material that was in the file that was turned over to me, and on the basis of the so-called briefing which was issued on the 5th of November 1953, I could come to a conclusion that MGB, in this particular case, considers that the NTS is a very strong organization in carrying its fight against the Soviet Union.

Mr. GRIMES. According to that information, do they carry on their fight against the Soviet Union preliminarily, as you have testified, to an ultimate revolution?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. NTS has a large volume of propaganda literature, such as bulletins, individual sheets, newspapers, and books, which it disseminates in the territory of the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy.

Mr. GRIMES. Based upon your intelligence information, how do they get it into Russia?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. They have their own cells and that is small organizations within the

banks of the Soviet Army and in the Soviet Union. For liaison with these cells, the NTS sends a large number of couriers regularly who cross the frontier and go to both the territory of the Soviet Union and the territory of the so-called countries of people's democracy.

Mr. GRIMES. Does he mean the satellite countries?

Mr. SEREBRENNIKOV (the interpreter). Yes, of course.

Mr. GRIMES. Apart from the many couriers which you have testified crossed the Russian border in behalf of the NTS to bring propaganda leaflets and other items of propaganda in, do they use the method of balloons to convey propaganda messages into Russia and into their cells within Russia?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This method has been written up in the newspapers, but this method was not a subject of the investigation on the part of the MGB.

The MGB was interested in the work of agents, and the data on the activities of the agents I had in great quantity.

Mr. GRIMES. Were some of the agents of the NTS who crossed the border and went into Soviet Russia apprehended?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, a certain number and a certain part, certain agents were tried officially; and other agents just perished without a trace behind the prison walls of the MGB.

Mr. GRIMES. What position did Okolovich occupy in the NTS?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. He was a leader of the so-called activities, which can also be translated as secret activities.

Mr. GRIMES. Will you describe the closed or secret activities?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. First of all, this work consisted of sending personnel, which means that first you had to select, to train them, and to train them in work, and to instill in them the spirit of the organization, and finally to brief them and to train them as to how they can accomplish the task with which they are charged.

Mr. GRIMES. To send the personnel into Russia itself, as well as the satellite countries?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes; also into Russia itself.

Mr. GRIMES. In a sense he, then, was in charge of the secret police of the NTS operating in very much the same manner that your branch operated for the Soviet Government; is that not so?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. He was the head and the soul of all secret intelligence work directed against the Soviet Union.

Mr. GRIMES. In a sense he was a sort of an opposite number of Panyushkin?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Only with the great difference in their purposes, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Panyushkin was an assassin and Okolovich was a propagandist; is that correct?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This is precisely so.

Mr. GRIMES. Is it a fact that the Soviet Government very much fears the operations of the NTS?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. This is an absolutely exact fact.

The CHAIRMAN. What they really fear is the fact that they, the NTS, are Russian emigres, who have turned against Russia?

Mr. KHOKHLOV. Yes, of course; this is the most fearful thing for them, because this is the movement of the Russian people.

As evidenced by Khokhlov's testimony, NTS is an alliance of anti-Communist individuals and organizations. Extremists, moderates, and conservatives are all welcomed into the common cause.

As a consequence, NTS sometimes has been the target of criticism for the crackpot views of some of its members on subjects unrelated to liberating the people

of Russia from the Soviet regime. Unbiased observers indicate, however, that NTS sticks to this primary objective with a remarkable singleness of purpose. They likewise feel that its secondary objective, establishing a democratic government adapted to Russian conditions and needs, is safe from extremist influences.

NTS has a following on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Its ideological basis is said to be Christian morals and recognition of human individuality. However, it is revolutionary in character because, knowing the nature of the Communist regime, it believes that nothing short of a revolution will destroy it. The NTS also believes that nothing short of a revolution carried out by the victimized people themselves will expose the nature of communism to the world.

Its program of action is:

First. To reduce the idea of revolt to terms generally understood and accepted by the people.

Second. To instruct the people how to fight; to develop leaders; and to speed up the formation of a revolutionary atmosphere.

Third. When the time is ripe, to overthrow the Reds and to substitute a democratic government.

To carry out this task, NTS has developed and put into practice a strategic plan adapted to conditions in a totalitarian state. It seeks to train and build a strong body of devoted and experienced revolutionary leaders to spearhead the revolt.

By various methods of underground propaganda the "molecular theory" of revolt described by Khokhlov is carried out. Individuals are encouraged to enroll in an organization, the members of which are unknown to each other except for cells or molecules of 2 or 3 trusted friends. One member only of each cell is known to one member only of another cell. As indicated by the testimony, to attain common aims and act uniformly, NTS couriers are in constant touch with these cells, passing along carefully planned instructions from revolutionary headquarters.

Aside from minor acts of defiance which can be carried on without too much risk, the present major effort by these cells is the enlistment of like-minded, trustworthy individuals into new cells. The effort is stimulated by tracing symbols and slogans of the NTS on walls, railroad cars, and the like. In this manner individuals predisposed to throw off the Red regime are made aware that they are not alone. Moreover, the sight of such signs proves to the citizen that an act of defiance against the Government was committed with impunity. He realizes that anyone who takes elementary precautions can do the same without much risk of detection.

Since these symbols express a particular set of ideas and political principles, their constant appearance helps to organize thought and unite people into a coordinated effort. By the surreptitious tracing of an NTS symbol, the individual is actually voting not only against the regime, but for a determined and positive purpose.

NTS believes it is creating inside Russia a new and growing political force over which the Government has no control. The growth of such a force, they say, will instill a growing feeling of insecurity in the ranks of Government supporters and reduce their efficiency. Thus a double-pronged process of strengthening the resistance through united revolutionary thinking and weakening the Government's dictatorial power of oppression by demoralizing its machinery is underway.

NTS sees three basic stages in the process of revolution against the Kremlin:

The first, longest, and least conspicuous stage is the formation of these many, coordinated cells.

The second is a transitional period in which the development of cells is advanced enough to stir up some to open outbursts against the Government, but inadequate to support a general revolt. NTS expects these outbursts to be suppressed, but hopes such evidences of popular opposition will hurt the morale of the police organization which is supposed to control them. As these outbursts grow in scope and violence, the repressive measures of the police are expected to become less and less decisive.

The third and final stage of general revolt will come when the country is ripe for a planned and organized general uprising.

This analysis by the NTS is based on the existing situation in Russia. Such a contingency as war would introduce entirely new factors calling for an entirely new strategy.

There are some who believe events behind the Iron Curtain already have proceeded to the second, or transitional, stage. As outward signs of rising populace resistance they cite (a) the reluctance, and sometimes absolute refusal, of Soviet troops to take repressive measures during the East German uprisings in June, last year; (b) workers' strikes at heavy industry centers in Russia; (c) strikes, riots, and stubborn resistance to the MVD by inmates in a number of Soviet concentration camps; (d) subversive activity by students' political organizations in Moscow, Leningrad, and other large centers. Arrests were so many, and rumors so widespread, that the Kremlin had to break its curtain of silence and publish reports about them in its own newspapers, thereby acknowledging the existence of active anti-communism amongst the younger generation.

Stalin's death and the fall of Beria, it is claimed, seriously undermined the hypnotic power of Soviet propaganda myths. The myths of the indestructible unity of Stalin's loyal disciples of the invincibility of the MVD; and many others were exposed in all their absurdity. People began to realize that the monsters of the Kremlin and their MVD henchmen are but ordinary mortals after all.

The struggle for power between Malenkov, Beria, and others following Stalin's death, and still going on, is having its debilitating effect on the Red machinery of government another way, too. For

it places every Red official in a tough spot. Big or little, he is constantly worried as to how he should behave in order to avoid suspicion and eventual vengeance from one of the rival factions.

Trained to demonstrate his loyalty through servility to his seniors and glorification of the supreme leader, he is at a loss how to meet the new situation. He knows what would happen if he glorifies a loser. Thus the Soviet official is no longer as efficient a servant of the regime as he used to be. His main preoccupation is to survive.

The plight of members of the MGB-MVD secret police organizations is even worse than that of the ordinary Soviet official. The purge of pro-Beria elements continues. Old hands, according to word from behind the Iron Curtain, prefer to play it safe. They refuse to use their initiative and imagination. Agents newly recruited to replace purged pro-Beria elements are generally inferior in quality and lack training and experience. Their work is crude and unreliable.

Exposure to anti-Communist literature, which it is their duty to collect, study, and criticize, also affects MVD and MGB men. It is interesting to note that Nikolai Khokhlov's tremendous respect for the NTS came almost entirely from his reading of the MGB dossiers on the organization. This general weakening of morale based on personal insecurity may help explain the unprecedented trek of MVD and MGB deserters to the West.

Conscious both of this increasing hostility from the population and a weakening in its police apparatus, the Kremlin recently embarked on a policy of concessions. Since totalitarian governments cannot go far along the path of reform, the effort backfired.

Soviet farmers began to spend more time in their own backyards and worry less about deliveries to the state. Soviet workers, disappointed with what they got, in many cases struck for more and actually got it because the MVD could not overcome their resistance. Amnesty to a few of the millions held prisoner by the Reds encouraged a general demand from concentration-camp prisoners for additional concessions, which again, the MVD proved powerless to deal with except by mass executions.

German prisoners of war who recently completed sentences at some of these camps report that the strikers even hoped the Americans would parachute weapons to them. Although the concentration camps submitted to force, these returned prisoners of war say the prisoners' resistance spirit has not been broken.

NTC appears to be highly encouraged by these events and claims a healthy share of the credit for bringing them about. Based on what it feels it has so far accomplished, NTS is making strenuous efforts to engage as many more individuals in its organization as possible. It seeks not only to draw civilians in its efforts, but boldly claims success in establishing revolutionary cells in the Red Army itself.

Since success or failure of an eventual open revolt depends on the quality of available leaders, NTS is said to direct much effort toward building up a large force of experienced revolutionary leaders and deploying them in strategical positions.

These elements are strictly forbidden to engage in any activities which could lead to premature disclosure of their anti-Communist connections. To reduce the danger of their exposure through betrayal they are isolated from contact with other NTS elements behind the Iron Curtain.

Khokhlov brought with him to the Jenner committee hearings two sample NTS propaganda pieces which were introduced into the record. One was a facsimile of a 100-ruble banknote on one side to attract attention to the anti-Soviet literature on the other side. The second was a handkerchief with a message printed on one side. They show the devious and various means NTS uses to spread its revolution propaganda behind the Iron Curtain.

If NTS claims are true, its printed propaganda barrage is a major effort indeed. Distribution of 9,693,350 propaganda pieces is claimed during 1951, another 11,220,000 pieces during 1952, and 17,847,130 during 1953.

Some of the propaganda pieces are in ordinary, undisguised leaflet form, as distinguished from the samples of disguised literature handed over by Khokhlov. They all contain basic information relating to the aims, nature, strategy, and tactics of the NTS. Two underground newspapers are of a similar nature.

Brochures and books dealing with ideological, political, and tactical problems and stories on revolutionary themes are bound inside innocent Soviet books, or in the covers of Soviet books. Facsimiles of major Soviet newspapers and magazines, railroad timetables, and similar publications containing concentrated or scattered propaganda material also are used.

Not only are such propaganda materials delivered by hand, dropped in public places, and otherwise manually distributed, but a number of mechanical devices and even balloons and rockets are used to gain wider clandestine distribution and protect individual NTS personnel from unnecessary risk.

As another means of spreading its views, NTS operates a mobile clandestine radio station known as Radio Free Russia. It operates mainly on Soviet shortwave frequencies.

Unlike the Voice of America, it is not inhibited by any diplomatic considerations. The station tries to transmit eight half-hour programs every day. Apart from such regular programs, the station interferes with Soviet radio programs and butts in on radio conversations between pilots of Red planes as they patrol over Germany.

During maneuvers tank crews can listen to it quite freely, and Radio Free Russia obligingly increases the number of its "wild" programs for their special benefit.

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Deserters from the Red army claim the programs are very effective because it is the only radio station that teaches the soldier what he has to do and how he has to act to protect himself from the MVD.

The station is, of course, subject to Soviet jamming, but it changes frequencies every 5 to 7 minutes, asking listeners to try to relocate it by tuning. When it broadcasts on Soviet wavelengths, its main objective is to throw in a slogan or a caustic remark during pauses in Soviet programs whenever it has a chance.

Not overlooking any possibilities to ridicule the Soviet Government in the eyes of its slaves, NTS engages in a running battle of wits with the MVD. One of its most successful capers was pulled off when the Soviet Government purchased a large well-advertised shipment of oranges from Italy.

Underground agents of the NTS operating in Italy succeeded in placing artistically made imitation oranges containing propaganda leaflets in a number of the crates.

When the oranges were unloaded in Russia and prepared for delivery to retailers, the MVD was informed of the trick.

It immediately had all the crates opened and every orange cut in half. It had the satisfaction of fishing out every single leaflet, but the population, instead of long-advertised oranges, received small quantities of juice. A few grumbled, but the majority chuckled. Rumors travel rapidly in a country where all news is censored.

If only a small part of the "cloak and dagger" story I have related is true, there still remains ample evidence that revolutionary processes are developing in the Soviet world.

These processes are a natural consequence of the ideological, political, social, and economic bankruptcy of the Communist regime. Their development was inevitable; the call of freedom is in the heart of every enslaved person and it is irresistible.

In short, this is the great weakness of the Soviet regime that can be exploited by the free world to gain ultimate, final victory over Communist world aggression.

Victory will not come easy, nor is it likely to come as quickly as many would like. The Soviet Government is still very strong and tenacious. It will fight tooth and nail for survival. But there is hardly anything the Kremlin can do internally to win the real support of the oppressed population.

On the other hand, many things can be done to encourage that population's active resistance to the regime. The dissemination of truth from the free world through the Iron Curtain to these people is basically no more than a technical problem which can be solved by funds, equipment, and courage.

One of the most basic and important truths that we must convey to these people is that we of the free world have no quarrel with the Soviet people themselves—that our only objective is to free them from the tyranny that enslaves

them and now threatens destruction of our own freedoms.

There is but one conclusion to be reached from what I have placed before you:

Under present circumstances, we can gain victory over Communist world aggression; we can gain that victory without war; but only by channeling our most effective physical and moral support to expand the forces behind the Iron Curtain dedicated to the destruction of the Soviet regime from within.

APPROPRIATIONS PROVIDE SOUND FARM PROGRAM—SOIL CONSERVATION AND RESEARCH EMPHASIZED

Mr. HAND. Mr. Speaker, this Congress, under the lead of President Eisenhower, has done and is doing a job which will be approved by almost all farmers in south Jersey.

The House passed the farm bill, which marks the beginning of a flexible-support program, and the end, I hope, of the rigid program which has done great disservice to agriculture generally, and to our farmers in particular.

I shall not here repeat the statement that I made to the House on July 1 in support of the amendment to start flexible supports, and stop rigid supports, except to emphasize two paragraphs of that speech. I then said:

There are many thousands of farmers who, of course, are directly benefited by this apparently eternal guaranty of prosperity, but what is overlooked is the fact that there are also many thousands of farmers who are not benefited at all. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. HESLTON] has called to your attention the situation with respect to New England farmers. I call your attention to the fact that the so-called basic commodities in my State of New Jersey which benefit from the present program of high, rigid price supports represent 2 percent of the total cash receipts of farmers in our State.

Of equal significance is that fact that our poultry, egg, and dairy farmers, who together represent 64 percent of the cash receipts in New Jersey, are not only not benefited, but are adversely affected by this program. The eggs that are sold in my district—one of the greatest egg-producing areas in this country—have to seek their support in the market place, while the grains that my egg producers have to buy are rigidly supported by artificially high prices.

The New Jersey Taxpayers Association has urged my help to move Government away from rigid 90 percent support program and the tremendous waste it has built up in unmanageable surpluses.

I wish there was time to quote in full the analysis of this serious and growing problem which has been reported by the Council of State Chambers of Commerce.

The worst part of this rigid support program and the resultant pileup of farm surpluses is that, if it is continued, it will react most seriously against the farmer himself. The time will come when the American taxpayer and the American consumer will no longer tolerate a tax burden and the cost-of-living burden which is imposed by a program which was essentially an incentive for wartime production, and not a perpetual guaranty of profits for the huge wheat, corn, and cotton farmers at the expense of all the rest of us.

I am convinced that the continuance of the 90 percent rigid program is bad for the Nation, and worse for the farmers and people of New Jersey, and I regret that it has been found wise even to compromise the issue. It should be met head-on, and we should revert, after too long a delay, to the flexible program which the Congress adopted 3 years ago.

I propose, therefore, to support the compromise embodied in the Harrison amendment with a little bit of reluctance. I would prefer to meet the issue directly, but I must remember that compromise is often the essence of reasonable legislation.

That compromise passed, and I hope the Senate will come up soon with a bill as good or better.

AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATIONS

Today, however, I want to speak of another great help to our local farmers, and that is the wise and generous action of the Appropriations Committee and the Congress in dealing with money needed for a sound program of aid to agriculture.

On March 10, I had the privilege of testifying before the House Committee on Agriculture Appropriations. I presented to them the views as I understand them, of our local farmers and farm organizations. I was received with great courtesy and consideration by the committee, which approved our views.

Among other things, I protested the proposed reduction in field area offices. A part of my discussion with the chairman follows:

Mr. HAND. The third point that he makes is, and I think possibly this might be almost the most important, the proposed reduction in field area offices.

Mr. ANDERSEN. You are correct. It is the most important.

Mr. HAND. As I understand it, the proposal is to reduce the authorization from 326 to 236.

Mr. ANDERSEN. Furthermore, the proposal is to increase the workload of each area office, Mr. HAND, from about 10 district units to 14. Many of us feel that that will be too heavy a load.

Mr. HAND. Yes, too heavy a load, and of course it does not effect too much saving. You might save some rent but I do not think you save too much staff if you are going to increase the staff.

Mr. ANDERSEN. As you know, in any of these programs you can spread supervision so thin that it becomes ineffective.

Mr. HAND. That is one of the problems we are facing in my own area right now. The supervision is good but it is spread too thin to be effective and we do not get the services of the experts that are sent down as much as we should. So that they have a grave question about that. They make the point that there has been in the past a considerable reduction in these field offices and they think it has been reduced about as much as it should be in order to continue with effective service.

Mr. ANDERSEN. Just to complete the record, I might say that the budget before us, Mr. HAND, does not contain sufficient money to staff these new soil-conservation districts which are to be brought into being in the next fiscal year. Now, we think that is a mistake. We cannot expect the other soil-conservation districts to continually loan their manpower to the job in these new districts.

Mr. HAND. From my limited knowledge, let me say I am in complete agreement with the chairman because it is on the level where the work is actually done that we must be careful to continue the work. That is correct.